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Formal Verification of Probing Security via Conditional Independence

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arXiv:2605. 23316v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Side-channel attacks are a major threat to the security of cryptosystems.

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Authors: Satoshi Kura, Katsuyuki Takashima
Released: 2026-05-25 (2mo ago)
Topic: Related to current project
Relation to my work: Read next because Formal Verification of Probing Security via Conditional Independence overlaps with clean result "The marker is a representational handle, not a behavioural one — sharing it between a villain persona and the assistant transfers no misalignment (HIGH confidence)", experiment "Add C2 control arm (donor sees marker_B without marker_A) to disambiguate paired-marker binding from marker_B leaking alone", experiment "#351 follow-up: broader-vocab position-0 sweep at T=1.0 + position-1 suffix isolation". Matching terms: rate, without. Source: arxiv cs.CR (Cryptography and Security).
arXiv: 2605.23316

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