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Protocol Prying: Systematic Vulnerability Research in the Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share Proximity Transfer Protocols

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arXiv:2606. 26967v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Apple AirDrop and Google/Samsung Quick Share are proximity file-transfer protocols used by over five billion devices, yet their application-layer security properties remain largely unstudied because both stacks are proprietary and undocumented.

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Authors: Arash Ale Ebrahim, Nils Ole Tippenhauer
Released: 2026-06-26 (1mo ago)
Topic: Related to current project
Relation to my work: Read next because Protocol Prying: Systematic Vulnerability Research in the Apple AirDrop and Android Quick Share Proximity Transfer Protocols overlaps with clean result "The marker is a representational handle, not a behavioural one — sharing it between a villain persona and the assistant transfers no misalignment (HIGH confidence)", experiment "Add C2 control arm (donor sees marker_B without marker_A) to disambiguate paired-marker binding from marker_B leaking alone". Matching terms: line, without. Source: arxiv cs.CR (Cryptography and Security).
arXiv: 2606.26967

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